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James Lorimer and the Character of Sovereigns: The Institutes as 21st Century Treatise  
 
Gerry Simpson
*
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In Vienna, Freud is completing his medical degree just as James Lorimer is polishing his 
Institutes of the Law of Nations in Edinburgh. I suppose the overall claim might be that 
Lorimer’s Institutes represents one sort of unwritten, ‘unwriteable’ textbook for our own time – 
international law’s uncivilized unconscious speaking to us from the late 19th century. More 
specifically, and because I am the only Scot writing as part of this symposium, I will begin by 
placing Lorimer in the cultural and political frame of late 19th-century Scotland. Then I will look 
at the state or, in particular, the not-quite-fully sovereign state and the way it preoccupied the late 
19th-century legal imagination and continues to do so today, albeit in a more obscure or discreet 
manner. Finally, I will conclude with some thoughts on Lorimer as a 21st-century scholar of war 
and peace. 
 
I remember dining a few years ago with Neil MacCormick, the author of Institutions of Law and 
a former holder of James Lorimer’s Regius Chair in Public Law and the Law of Nature and 
Nations.
1
 I pride myself in knowing a little about the major figures in Scottish literature of the 
20th century, and Neil seemed to know most of them personally. In Aberdeen, I studied Scottish 
literature at the same time as I was attending a course on Roman law, and it is in the spirit of this 
eccentric combination that I will say something later in my article about the literary scene around 
Lorimer in mid to late 19th-century Edinburgh. 
I visited Edinburgh in 2004, invited by Stephen Tierney and Alan Boyle, and gave a talk 
at the Scottish Centre for International Law. The next day, I went to a bar in order to soak in the 
atmosphere surrounding the opening of the new Scottish Parliament, which was attended by the 
Queen, and found myself sitting next to three elderly gentlemen, each exuding enormous vitality 
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for their age. They all looked like Sean Connery, and one of them was Sean Connery. Is it 
patriotism or nostalgia that leads us to describe Connery as the best James Bond? Scotland, it 
seems, likes to produce at least one world-class individual in most fields of endeavour. James 
Boswell in literary biography, Robert Burns in romantic poetry, David Hume and Adam Smith, 
of course, and Andy Murray, Charles Rennie Mackintosh, Walter Scott and Hugh MacDiarmid 
(very probably). But did it have a world-class international lawyer in the 19th century? I do not 
really know. Lorimer himself wondered if international lawyers in general could rise above 
mediocrity: ‘There is, as far as I know, not a single instance of a man of first rate speculative 
ability who has ever made the law of nations as a science, the study of his life.’2 
This statement strikes me as a bit defeatist and self-denying (though it resembles 
something Martin Wight said about philosophers). According to him, philosophers, in general, 
save their best international thought for political theories of the sovereign state rather than for 
interstate relations.
3
 The symposium invitation, from which this article emerges, seems to be 
making a claim on Lorimer’s behalf: ‘Lorimer’s ideas have undoubtedly been widely 
influential,’ it states at one point. Is this true? Douglas Johnston, in his survey of the barely 
visible ‘Scottish Tradition in International Law’, regrets the fact that Lorimer had suffered ‘the 
fate of oblivion’.4 The Scots Law Review, in its obituary for Lorimer, attributes it to ‘the 
degrading inefficiency’ of the University of Edinburgh faculty at the time. It goes on to bemoan 
the sight of ‘an accomplished Professor, of European reputation, year by year haranguing 
benches barely vitalised’.5 On the other hand, when Wilfred Jenks spoke about Lorimer at 
Burlington House in London at the 50th anniversary of his death, he was introduced by Lord 
Alness who described Lorimer as ‘the only jurist produced in Scotland, during the century, with 
a truly European reputation’.6 (Whatever we think of this, there is something almost heroic about 
the idea of a group of international lawyers gathering in London in the winter of 1940 in order to 
discuss a 60-year-old proposal for international organization that must have seemed, at that 
point, remote in time and space.)  
                                                          
2
 J. Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political 
Communities, 2 vols (1883), vol. 1, at 61–62. 
3
 Wight, ‘Why There Is No International Theory’, in H. Butterfield, W. Herbert and M. Wight (eds), Diplomatic 
Investigations (1966) 21. 
4
 Johnston, ‘The Scottish Tradition in International Law’ 16 Canadian Yearbook of International Law (1978) 3, at 
38. 
5
 6 Scots Law Review 71 (1890), cited in ibid., at 39.  
6
 Lord Alness, ‘Remarks’, in Grotius Proceedings (1940) <first page?>.  
It is true, though, that I do not hear Lorimer’s name invoked as I attend conferences or 
read journals and books. He does not feature much in The Creation of States (though he is in the 
general bibliography) or in, say, recent work on statehood or international organization.
7
 He is 
rarely placed among the great Europeans, and no volume of the European Journal of 
International Law has until now been devoted to exegeses on his work. I first came across James 
Lorimer in 1985 in a course called ‘Scottish 18th Century Legal Thought’, which was taught by 
the legal historian Kenneth Mackinnon to a class of five students in his tiny office overlooking 
Elphinstone Hall (named after Bishop Elphinstone who had founded one of Aberdeen’s two 
15th-century universities [the same number as England had at the time]).
9
 I had not expected to 
encounter anyone from the 19th century in this course, nor did I expect that an international 
lawyer from the 19th century would feature among the Hutchesons, Fergusons, Stairs and so on. 
But the course seemed to concern itself – to invert Eric Hobsbawm – with the long 18th century.  
The Lorimer I took away from this course was one more natural lawyer, but this time one 
who applied natural law to international law (a subject I had taken little interest in at that point) 
and one who, as a 19th-century Victorian imperialist, would happily divide the world into 
civilized states, barbarians and savages.
10
 Am I the only person alive who can claim that 
Lorimer’s Institutes of the Law of Nations is the first international law book that I read? After 
Lorimer, as one might expect, Louis Henkin, Richard Pugh, Oscar Schachter, David Harris and 
Malcolm Shaw came as a bit of a shock to me. Where were the barbarians; the missing sections 
on relative and plenary recognition; the lengthy disquisitions on legation or private international 
law; the fear and loathing of the savage?  
This imperial Lorimer seemed to represent a pre-modern version of a tendency to 
pathologize certain states. Lorimer divided polities into three categories, and the same tripartite 
scheme is found, for example, in John Rawls’ The Law of Peoples (liberal, decent and illiberal, 
outlaw) and almost qualifies as a motif in international thinking on the state.
11
 And Lorimer is 
chilling, too, because he invoked a whole language of development drawn from local, medical 
categories of imbecility or nonage and applied these to states in ways that seemed evocative at a 
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later point when sovereigns were being described as ‘underdeveloped’, ‘burdened’ or ‘failed’.12 
Indeed, on first encountering Lorimer, there is something comic and, at the same time, sinister 
about his efforts to produce scientific theories of state or racial development or inequality. He 
was a connoisseur of the fine distinction; his taxonomies at times raging out of control.
13
 He 
believed in class and classification and, especially, in national destiny, and the combination of 
these beliefs take him in directions that look retrospectively dubious.  
I would like to do three things in this article. First, because I am the only Scot writing as 
part of this symposium, I will place Lorimer in the cultural and political frame of late 19th-
century Scotland. Second, I will look at the state or, in particular, the not-quite-fully sovereign 
state and the way it preoccupied the late 19th-century legal imagination and continues to do so 
today, albeit in a more obscure or discreet manner. Finally, I will conclude with some thoughts 
on Lorimer as a 21st-century scholar of war and peace. In Vienna, Freud is completing his 
medical degree just as Lorimer is polishing his Institutes of the Law of Nations in Edinburgh. I 
suppose the overall claim might be that Lorimer’s Institutes represents one sort of unwritten, 
unwriteable textbook for our own time – international law’s uncivilized, unconscious speaking to 
us from the late 19th century.
14
  
 
1 Lorimer and Scotland 
 
The Scottish intellectual elites had a good 19th century. Yet, by the 1860s, there may have been a 
sense that the moment had passed. George Steiner, in Bluebeard’s Castle, describes this period 
as one of melancholy yearning for the idealism of the French Revolution conjoined to a sadness 
that political contestation was gone – an early version of the end of history.15 The Scottish 
Enlightenment had certainly run out of steam by this time. Hume, Smith, the Scottish 
philosophers of the common sense tradition, Walter Scott and the very modern gothic James 
Hogg had lived, and produced their work, in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. William 
Blackwood, Lorimer’s publisher, had begun publishing in the early 19th century, and this we 
might say was the moment to be alive in Edinburgh. James Buchan, in Capital of the Mind: How 
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Edinburgh Invented the Modern World, ends his story of the great Lothian flourishing more or 
less just as Lorimer is ascending to his professorship.
16
  
Lorimer then is post-Enlightenment, though I cannot find much Adam Smith or David 
Hume in his work. At times, he sounds like the anti-Hume, compulsively deriving ‘ought’ from 
‘is’ at every opportunity. For Lorimer, there is precisely an urge to reason towards common 
assumptions or answers to pressing problems through reference to nature, and there is very little 
about the sorts of techniques that might permit such deductions. On the other hand, Lorimer is 
steeped in the historicism of another Scottish tradition (<first names?> Kames, Robertson). 
There may be universal propositions available to reasoning man, but men (and states) are very 
different and occupy different stages in their historical development in relation to these 
propositions. 
We can imagine in the late 19th century an atmosphere of decline as well around the idea 
of Scotland as a national project and European public law as a pacifying influence. This was the 
beginning of the Balmoral period with Victorian Scotland serving as a neutered royal 
playground. And, in Lorimer’s work, there are portents of the disaster that is to befall Europe and 
Scotland in the early 20th century. Still, the Scottish mercantile and administrative elites are 
doing well out of empire at the time that Lorimer is writing Institutes of the Law of Nations. 
There is an impressive literary cadre in Edinburgh around Lorimer. Robert Louis Stevenson, who 
studied Scots law at Edinburgh University, published Treasure Island and The Strange Case of 
Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde at the same time as the Institutes appeared, and, in some ways, of course, 
Lorimer could be understood to be an archetypal Victorian Scot caught between sober judgment 
and wild romantic fantasy – half Hanoverian, half Jacobite. Schemes for world peace are set 
against warnings about idealism. The jural separateness of nations co-exists with pleas for a 
highly interventionist international executive.  
Like many Scots, Lorimer aligned himself with Europe.
17
 His interlocutors tended to be 
European and not English. Befriending Europe, as always, was a way in which Scots could 
differentiate themselves from the insular English. It is clear from Studies: National and 
International (his lectures and essays) that he wants to position himself as a national and 
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European man of greatness. One can imagine his delight at this symposium in his name, 
published in the European Journal of International Law, though his regret that Scotland has not 
produced a scholar of jurisprudence to match its exploits in political economy and philosophy 
might come off as a bit self-advertising. As if he is positioning himself for posterity, he urges at 
one point: ‘I can see no reason why Edinburgh should not vie with Heidelberg and Bonn’.18  
Lorimer certainly has a Scottish style. There seems to be something local and distinctive 
about his writing, especially his affection for the casual put-down. He accuses Samuel von 
Pufendorf of ‘unpardonable dullness’; the 1877 conference at Constantinople is the ‘first 
diplomatic transaction on a great scale which yielded no results whatever, either real or 
imaginary, even at the time’; Grotius is accused of ‘laying down principles and failing to pick 
them up again’ and so on.19 Boswell had it, Hugh MacDiarmid had it.20 It is a familiar trait, 
almost a national characteristic and one that often lapses into facetiousness. There is not really 
enough of this in a field in which politeness and formality seem the dominant tonalities despite 
the enormity of what is at stake. However, this quirky style hardly represents a ‘Scottish 
tradition’.  
Douglas Johnston concedes that there has not been a Scottish school of international 
law.
21
 Certainly, Scottish international lawyers were not very evident when I eventually did 
study public international law here.
22
 There is one famous Scottish case, the Dornoch fishing 
judgment, Mortensen v. Peters, which still features in cases and materials, and Scottish 
international lawyers have made a contribution, of course.
23
 Johnston mentions William 
Welwood’s counter-Grotian defence of enclosure in the 17th century24 and James Reddie’s 
Inquiries into International Law (1842).  
There may be some Scottish themes present in international law. For example, Scottish 
international law, as befits an island nation (a specially affected statelet, perhaps), has tended to 
look outwards to the sea (as in Welwood’s case), but if this is a national characteristic, then 
Lorimer is atypical in this regard. There is precious little law of the sea in Institutes of the Law of 
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Nations. On the other hand, Lorimer’s combination of sovereignty as national self-fulfilment and 
international organization as cosmopolitan necessity might be quintessentially Scottish. After all, 
Scotland relinquished its sovereignty for a multi-national project (the United Kingdom) and 
periodically seeks to have it returned in some capacity while looking again at the comforting idea 
of ‘Scotland in Europe’. His nationalism also works alongside his cosmopolitanism (Lorimer 
was a supporter of schools of Scottish architecture and restored Scottish castles when not 
developing schemes for the federation of Europe).
25
 
Just to bring us up to date on this Scottish proto-tradition, more recent examples of 
prominent Scottish practitioners would include Lord Iain Bonomy at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Lord Patrick, the Scottish judge (and vice-president) at 
the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.
26
 Patrick co-wrote the majority judgment, and Bonomy, in a 
recent essay about Patrick, noted that his main difference of opinion with William Webb, the 
Australian president of the Court, was that Webb had applied unfamiliar natural law ideas, 
derived partly from a reading of Lorimer, to the Japanese defendants.
27
 The Tokyo War Crimes 
Trial, like so much in life, turns out of have been a largely Scottish affair.  
 
2 Lorimer and the Character of Sovereigns  
 
In 1945, the Japanese were the latest incarnation of the enemy of mankind, and there is at least 
an aspect of international law (certainly, international criminal law) that might be defined as the 
law applied to such figures (from pirates to tyrants).
28
 Lorimer’s work partly belongs in this 
tradition, a tradition in which international society’s self-understanding is parasitic on an image 
of groups outside that society. However, I think in some ways he wants to formulate 
international law as two projects: a project of differentiation and a project of consolidation. 
These projects are developed in the midst of at least three great geopolitical struggles occurring 
in the late middle years of the 19th century: the mapping of Africa (forming the context for 
Lorimer’s Victorian imperialism), the Franco-Prussian war (influencing Lorimer’s ideas about 
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the great power conflict and the political exception) and the US Civil War (which lends urgency 
to his discussions of rebellion, belligerency and secession as distinctive topics in his treatise and 
in his published lectures).  
However, Lorimer also defies a few expectations we might have about the 19th century.
29
 
His naturalism, for example, seems unusually full-blooded and late in the day, and his ideas 
about interdependence seem to arrive at a moment when we are told that positivism had (finally) 
elevated independent sovereignty as the organizing norm of the interstate political order 
(projecting back to the myth of 1648 in order to do so).
30
  
 
A Consolidation and Organization  
 
As far as consolidation is concerned, Lorimer is best known for his thoughts (perhaps proleptic) 
on international organization, in general, and on arbitration, in particular. This is where his 
libertarianism about state development comes into mild tension with the thought that state 
freedom might have to be constrained by international institutionalism. In Studies: National and 
International, the posthumous collection of his lectures, he offers a very elaborate vision of the 
sort of arrangement he has in mind: an institution with annual meetings in Geneva or Brussels; 
voting in relation to power and revenue or exports and imports; a forerunner of the Military Staff 
Committee and a proposal that aggressive states be excluded from the organization. Lorimer 
anticipates Articles 2(7) and 39 of the Charter of the United Nations when he states in his own 
Principle 9 that national questions be excluded from the deliberations of the Council but that the 
Council should determine whether a matter was national or international. And he anticipates the 
actual practice of the Security Council when he argues that even civil wars should come within 
the jurisdiction of the international executive (but not rebellions – the distinction being as 
obscure and central as it is in relation to Libya and Syria today).
31
  
Whenever one reads about Lorimer, he is described as a bit of a dreamer, and these plans 
must have seemed visionary at the time. Now they feel very familiar. But if Lorimer was 
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idealistic about international organization (or, perhaps, Hobbesian in his blunt assessment that 
only centralization can complete international legality, combined with his sense that this might 
be something to be feared about this very project at the same time), he was much more hard-
headed about dispute resolution and arbitration. Indeed, he is so busy nominating possible 
subjects as being unsuitable for arbitration that he sounds like the US pleadings at the 
preliminary phase of the Nicaragua case.
32
  
According to Lorimer, arbitration is impossible in at least two states of nature. The first is 
war between great powers, and here he is thinking of the Franco-Prussian war – where the war 
will define the relative standing of the two warring parties in a way that is not possible through 
the application of norms or principles of law. Here, too, one is reminded of the Serbian effort on 
25 July 1914 to have the Great War settled through arbitration in The Hague.
33
 The second state 
of nature, of course, is in relations between civilized and non-civilized states because uncivilized 
states lack a rational will and, in any case, would not comply with arbitral awards.
34
  
 
B Differentiation 
 
This relationship between the civilized core and uncivilized periphery is not just central to 
Lorimer’s work, but it is also defining in international law. To paraphrase Tony Anghie, some 
states make international law and some are made by it. Thus, we have Hersch Lauterpacht, 
mildly rebuking Lorimer seventy years after his Institutes of the Law of Nations, when he says 
that the whole of interstate relations are rather like Lorimer’s description of core-periphery 
relations: ‘The relations between States belonging to the community of nations are, so far, under 
the sway of limitations which Lorimer assigned to the field of relations with uncivilised peoples.’ 
<page citation for this quotation?> In other words, relations between the civilized and 
uncivilized are the paradigm case in international society.
35
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Of course, Lorimer’s distinction was a fairly standard 19th-century view in one sense. 
And it does not seem to be generated by Lorimer’s apparent naturalism. As many people have 
pointed out, ‘positivism’ too was implicated with its distinction between civilized and 
uncivilized states and its belief that actual existence or capacity was somehow anterior to 
recognition in international law.
36
 Uncivilized states sat beyond international law. Relations in 
these cases were a matter of something other than law. James Crawford might recall his own 
footnote comparing two editions of Oppenheim: ‘Lauterpacht omits the sentence: “It is discretion 
and not International Law, according to which the members of the Family of Nations deal with 
such States as still remain outside that family”.’37 Omitting this sentence has been a distinctively 
20th-century project in the modernizing of international law.
38
  
Lorimer’s work then plays into the image of the 19th century as a place where 
sovereignty was fragmented (prior to its consolidations in the mid-20th century), where the 
distinction between civil and uncivil states was dominant and in which there was a struggle 
between positivism and naturalism.
39
 Certainly, Lorimer is determined to oppose the 
utilitarianism of Bentham and what he takes to be the positivism of Austin and the dominant 
school of international law at the time. Utility is the mere ‘preferences of men’, as he puts it in 
one of his essays. And it makes sense that someone burnishing his anti-democratic credentials so 
frequently would not be interested in basing either political decision or political philosophy 
around the collective wishes of the demos. This would simply be philosophy repeating 
democracy’s mistake. And it all feeds into Lorimer’s aristocratic ideas about social organization 
and ambivalence about state equality. So let me say a little more about this combination of class 
and classification. 
 
C Class and Classification  
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Lorimer has become known as someone for who state equality or sovereign equality was a 
misguided fiction.
40
 His classifications were intended to put international law on a firmer footing 
and to bring the reality of relative state power, material circumstances and culture into some sort 
of conformity with the law and to harness all of this to his ideas for international organizations 
or, rather, to permanent international organizations arranged around impermanent hierarchies of 
sovereigns. He ends up replacing one (arguably) civilizing fiction with a series of malign fictions 
of his own. 
This may or may not have had something to do with the way in which 18th-century 
Scottish intellectuals were interested in mathematics as a way of understanding philosophy. This 
goes back to Smith and Hume again and their fascination with Isaac Newton, but it is also true 
that as early (or as late) as the 16th century someone like Welwood could be a professor of 
mathematics and write a treatise on the law of the sea.
41
 Lorimer was also influenced by a 
German chemistry professor under whom he had studied. This is likely to have had two effects – 
one was a belief in laws of human nature (just as there were laws of science) but it also might 
have led Lorimer to apply the classification systems found in chemistry to international law, a 
sort of periodic table of states.  
For him, this inequality is a fact of human nature, the basis for a natural law of nations, 
and states have a duty to recognize situations brought about by, or grounded in, this inequality.
42
 
Alfred Tennyson, another Lorimer contemporary, though considerably older, in his very late 
poem of the 1880s, Locksley Hall Sixty Years Later, discourses in a similar way about equality. 
This is doggerel, but we get the idea:  
 
Equal born? O yes, of yonder hill be level with the flat 
Charm us, Orator, till the Lion look no larger than the Cat  
Till the cat thro’ that mirage of overheated language loom 
Larger than the Lion – Demos end in working its own doom.43 
 
For Lorimer, some versions of international law would qualify as ‘overheated language’ 
producing fatal and misconceived formal equalities. 
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Lorimer’s writing on equality is derived from a very firm sense that social and political 
hierarchies are vital to the health of nations. Sounding like virtually all of our politicians of the 
centre and right, Lorimer understands class war to be a politics of envy, and he is full of New 
Labour-style praise for the self-denying grandeur of the aristocracy.
44
 And there is something a 
bit Blairite about Lorimer’s insistence that within a circumscribed field, he is willing to endorse 
many forms of political life, providing each produces good administration. There is a limit 
though – democracy is declared ‘impossible’ since inequality is God’s work45 and savages are 
unable to govern themselves.
46
  
These ideas about civilization, which are now applied to states, were common at the time, 
of course. Gerrit Gong’s book on The Standard of Civilisation documents the ways in which 
international law methodically distinguishes the family of nations from mere states on the 
outside.
47
 This cataloguing is a feature of a younger contemporary of Lorimer’s, the Scottish 
don, J.G. Frazer, who, in The Golden Bough (1890), produces a typology of the barbarian 
(although as Robert Crawford in his possibly definitive History of Scottish Literature puts it, 
‘Frazer never did any fieldwork; probably he had never seen a “savage”’).48 In international law, 
one of Lorimer’s interlocutors, John Westlake, famously contrasted states with good breeding 
with other states,
49
 and for Lassa Oppenheim, there is the familiar distinction between the family 
of nations and states outside the family.
50
 Nonetheless, it would have to be conceded that there is 
an undiluted racial element to Lorimer that is lacking in some of his Victorian contemporaries.  
Lorimer’s classifications are astonishingly ornate but perhaps not as odd as they seem on 
first blush. Nonage, of course, as we have seen, becomes a familiar idea in the mandates and in 
the trusteeship doctrine. The idea that some states are ‘crazy or sinister’, as Martin Wight puts it, 
is reflected in Lorimer’s ideas about the imbecility of states. This comes in two forms: either 
congenital (because of some racial defect) or political (because of the nature of a particular 
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political orientation). Communism and nihilism are given as examples.
51
 We get a sense of the 
empire’s confusions about the stability of these terms in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, 
where empire begins with a project and ends in hallucination. Marlow experiences Lorimer’s 
categories as precarious and absurd. Marlow’s encounters with Africans maps onto international 
law’s own prevarications. They are first described as enemies by one of the other administrators, 
but Marlow cannot quite believe in this designation: ‘[H]e called them enemies!’ Later, he 
conjures with possible definitions (natives,
52
 enemies,
53
 criminals
54
) but concludes that they are 
merely ‘unhappy savages’ (indeed, they are so demoralized that they do not even find him 
appetizing).
55
 In the end, they become obscure to him. ‘[N]ot enemies, not criminals, not earthly 
… phantoms’,56 they are ‘incomplete, evanescent’.57 As Marlow puts it, ‘[w]hat would be the 
next definition I would hear?’.58 I have the same feeling reading Lorimer.59  
It is hard not to read Lorimer’s ideas as being more than imperial, perhaps even 
dangerous. The idea that human beings enjoy natural claims to development (derived from 
liberty) is transposed into a highly developmental account of the way in which nations or states 
are depicted in the Institutes of the Law of Nations. Certainly, there is a great deal of talk of 
freedom and destiny. Lauterpacht goes as far as to say that the views of the Hegelians (among 
whom he includes Lorimer) cannot be reconciled with law itself.
60
 Johnston, in a highly 
contentious aside, even claims that Lorimer’s thought that states had a right to unfettered 
development (via Georg Hegel) was to be ‘barbarously abused half a century later in Nazi claims 
to Lebensraum’.61 This is pretty strong stuff and does not seem right given the way in which 
Lorimer also accentuates the idea of interdependence. Still, Lorimer’s prejudices (against Turks 
and Musselmen, in particular) are never far from the surface of his thoughts. Indeed, the 1856 
Treaty of Paris (guaranteeing Ottoman independence at a time when it was no longer capable of 
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guaranteeing its own independence) is regularly exhibited when it comes to pointing out how 
misconceived the attribution of equality might be.
62
  
Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, meanwhile, in their discussion of Lorimer’s influence on 
the Tokyo War Crimes Trial indict Lorimer’s naturalism as colonial: ‘[N]aturalism is often … 
considered implicated in the colonial project, perhaps most notoriously, in the (comparatively) 
modern era with James Lorimer’s characterisation of levels of sovereignty based on standards of 
civilisation.’63 But if these are easy pickings, there are also problems internal to Lorimer’s 
reasoning. He professes to deplore immutability and equality (or equalization) and, yet, his 
civilized states are regarded as equal and his savages are equally savage. It would be too much to 
expect Lorimer to have picked up the interpenetrations around space and law found over a 
century later in, say, Lauren Benton’s work, but his distaste for immutability combined with the 
constant referencing of, say, reciprocity or freedom as permanent facts of existence begin to 
seem strained and full of bad faith.
64
 
Although the international system seemed ready by the early 20th century to repudiate 
these late Victorian hierarchies and standards of civilization, Lorimer’s categories continued to 
hover over the way the mandate system operated – for example, with its mathematical regard for 
states of development. The A, B and C mandates are still with us in some respects (I have been 
reading Lorimer in Australia where the government is putting its unwanted refugee claimants on 
Nauru, an original C Class mandate. Hegel knew that this equality [what he calls ‘autonomy’] 
was merely a formality). This tripartite scheme goes back as well to Pufendorf, who wants to 
draw a distinction between those individuals entirely outside the system (towards whom ‘it will 
be necessary for other men to show them no more mercy than they do birds of prey’) and the 
marginal cases who are ‘so partial [a very Lorimer word] as to be just in the Observation of 
compacts with [only] some particular Allies. … [T]heir Credit, it is evident, must very much 
sink, but it would be too severe to deny them every degree of esteem’.65  
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edn <complete citation: initial, title 
and year> In order to be a state, ‘the inhabitants of the territory must have attained a degree of civilisation’ (at 73, 
quoted in Crawford, supra note 48).  
3 Lorimer as a 21st-Century Treatise 
 
Alongside the obsessions with classification and the gestures towards international organization, 
Lorimer seems to have written a text on intervention and war in the early 21st century, and I 
want to finish by pursuing this theme a little.
66
 
 
A Natural Law 
 
There is a lot to be said about Lorimer’s prescience. If we take Lorimer as a natural lawyer 
somehow out of time, then it is fair to ask whether he was just foreshadowing a return to a 
natural law in the middle of the 20th century.
67
 There have been explicit versions of this question 
(in Nuremberg and Tokyo in the 1940s), and it is found more implicitly in the way in which 
international criminal law institutionalizes a pre-political commitment to end impunity. It also 
reflects some transcendentally true objection and distaste for genocide or mass killing as well as 
the possibility that there is a distinction (famously deplored by Prosper Weil
68
) to be drawn 
between ordinary rules of international law and supernorms of ius cogens or international crime 
or obligations owed erga omnes. There are also the various ways in which the sacred or trans-
historical is smuggled back into international law – or has never been absent – in the form of an 
‘evolving world community’,69 a commitment to universal human rights70 or a teleology of 
development.
71
  
And surely there is something very modern about Lorimer’s claim that a positive form of 
international law is a ‘form of speech of which the real must always fall short of the ostensible 
signification’72 and also in his awareness that codification might just rehearse the very 
disagreements that it was meant to escape.
73
 The varied ‘character’ of states and the 
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asymmetrical relations produced by differences in character is found in Lorimer’s description of 
the ‘capitulations’ with the Ottomans, China and Japan. However, this could also be a 
description of the way in which the Western powers still dis-apply local jurisdiction (through 
status of forces agreements) and international jurisdiction (through, say, Security Council 
resolutions). Lorimer states at one point: ‘[T]he recognising States consequently maintain 
separate courts exercising separate jurisdiction within the borders of the partially recognised 
states.’74 In another mildly prophetic moment, Lorimer discusses the possibility of mixed 
tribunals: courts in which there are representatives of civilized and semi-barbarous states on the 
judiciary. Such arrangements may ‘give a greater or less preponderance to the native 
[foreshadowing the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia] or foreign [the Sierra 
Leone Special Court] element, as circumstances demand’.75 I want to end, though, by insinuating 
Lorimer into two areas of contemporary war law: the current practices of intervention and the 
recent efforts to criminalize aggression.  
 
B Intervention  
 
According to Lorimer, intervention is excluded in normal relations between sovereigns, but all 
bets are off when a situation of abnormality arises. The abnormality in relations, though, is 
created by the intervening states themselves. They declare the object state to be an unrecognized 
entity or not fully sovereign and therefore lacking an immunity from intervention. In a way, 
Lorimer’s theory of barbarian war in the 19th century might be becoming a generalized practice 
of war in the 21st century. Wars are abolished not by refusing to fight them but, rather, by 
refusing to concede that violence can even be designated ‘war’. ‘Enemies’ become ‘enemies of 
mankind’ and warriors become ‘pirates’. To go to war today, we might say, is to assume an 
anterior relationship of inequality. Just as the 19th-century colonial war or war against the savage 
or barbarian was not war but, rather, ‘gunboat diplomacy’, ‘suppression of the natives’ or ‘police 
action’, so too postmodern war can be described as anything but war – anything but what it is.76 
Thus, we have the language of peace making, peacekeeping and peace enforcement by the forces 
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of humanity against those who defy or resist humanity (one of the interesting consequences of 
this in recent practice is a sort of indignation that anyone would fire back).  
International lawyers and others have been agitated over the past decade about the 
attempts to expand the right to self-defence to include pre-emptive self-defence.
77
 However, 
perhaps the more symptomatic move in this period – and predating it – is to circumscribe rights 
to ordinary self-defence (on the part of sovereign unequals such as Iraq, Iran and Serbia) to an 
almost vanishing point. Appropriately enough, it was a former pirate – but then perhaps 
Thucydides was right and everyone is a former pirate – who put this best. William Dampier (who 
later rescued Alexander Selkirk, the Fife-born model for Robinson Crusoe, which was later 
rewritten as Robinson by the Edinburgh author, Muriel Spark) wrote of Papuan natives in the 
19th century, describing them as ‘[a] fierce and intractable race of savages who, when fired 
upon, did not scruple to retaliate’.78 This is, again, an era of unscrupulous retaliation. One gets a 
similar sense of indignation from reports of Western forces in Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya, which 
is reflected to an extent in attempts to reconfigure the legal regime whether by converting 
enemies into terrorists or by depriving detainees of the protections of the laws of war.  
Lorimer, then, is of his time and of our time. As the Institutes of the Law of Nations were 
being published, Alexandria was set ablaze after undergoing a shelling by the Royal Navy, while 
Gladstone, in Parliament, invokes an early version of humanitarian intervention. Meanwhile, a 
few years earlier, Lord Elgin was bombing Canton during the Opium Wars. The pretext was that 
the Chinese authorities had boarded a pirate vessel, which the British claimed was flying the 
Union Jack: ‘These half-civilised Governments such as those in China, Portugal, Spanish 
America all require a dressing down every 8 or ten years to keep them in order.’79 This, then, 
was China’s dressing down.80 The government got into hot water (not so much for going to war 
but, rather, for choosing the wrong pretext). They sought the attorney-general’s legal advice, and 
he said the war would probably be regarded as illegal. The prevailing mood, however, according 
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to John Newsinger, was that international law did not apply when dealing with barbarous 
states.
81
  
This tendency to organize interstate relations around the character of sovereigns or to 
deny certain sovereigns full plenary recognition and protection remains pervasive, if more 
euphemistically stated. Lorimer’s ‘imbeciles’ became ‘those territories and colonies … which are 
inhabited by people not yet able to stand for themselves’ (Article 22 of the League of Nations 
Covenant and then Robert Jackson’s ‘negative sovereigns’).82 Later, Lorimer’s ‘intolerant 
democracies’ become Tony Blair’s ‘irresponsible states’ or the Department of State’s ‘states of 
concern’. Surely, too, the idea of the responsibility to protect people from these irresponsible 
states seems to be there in the interstices of Lorimer’s work.83 For him, intervention might be, for 
example, a duty in the face of a deprivation of sovereign freedom.
84
 Indeed, he anticipates a 
constitutive distinction in the work of the United Nations when he contrasts ‘double intervention’ 
(intervening on both sides) or what we now think of as peacekeeping and ‘single intervention’ 
(or peace enforcement).
85
 
 
C Aggression and Character  
 
Today, war is alternately understood as administrative error or international crime.
86
 We might 
compare the Chilcot Inquiry
87
 with the Kampala Agreement in 2010
88
 – one thinking of war as a 
failure of bureaucratic process, the other as a matter of criminal intent. However, as Lorimer put 
it: ‘All errors are not crimes.’89 I find that this little aphorism eerily foreshadows much of what 
has happened to war and law in the 20th and 21st centuries. A.J.P. Taylor once said that states 
did not commit crimes, they made mistakes. And half a century after that, Lord Hoffman in the 
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Iraq War civil disobedience case, R v. Jones, noted that the defence in this case ‘thus depend 
upon the proposition that the war in Iraq was a crime as well as a mistake’.90  
At Kampala in 2010, the Assembly of States Parties finally concluded that wars could be 
crimes as well as mistakes and concocted a definition of aggression or, at least, provided the 
Court with a few clues as to the meaning of aggression.
91
 It defined aggression as a manifest 
breach of the UN Charter, the manifestness to be derived from a study of the scale, gravity and 
character of the aggression.
92
 I suspect, though, and following Lorimer, that the character of the 
aggressor and not the quality of the act is likely to be a critical feature of any judicial 
determination. But Lorimer captures in his work something else that is important about the crime 
of aggression. As Justice Pal noted in his massive dissenting judgment at Tokyo, in the absence 
of a just global order, criminalizing aggression itself creates an injustice. Lorimer is succinct: 
‘[F]irst purity, then peace.’93 In other words, we should not criminalize aggression until we have 
achieved justice. Lorimer hopes – for all of his scepticism – that war might be abolished just as 
the duel ceased to be an accepted social practice after the 19th century. However, in the absence 
of justice, or perhaps in its name, inter-sovereign warfare as a duel was simply supplanted by 
more punitive exercises of violence.  
At Tokyo, in fact, Webb had relied on Lorimer for this naturalist support for the existence 
of the crime of aggression, stating in a letter sent at the time: ‘If, with Professor Lorimer in 
Institutes of International Law (1884 [sic]), we regard international law as the law of nature 
realised in the relations of separate political communities, then aggressive war is a crime under 
international law.’94  It is not at all clear how or why this follows. Of course, Nuremberg and 
Tokyo are often described as having provoked a revival in naturalism (crimes against humanity, 
the conscience of mankind, the gaps in positive law that had to be filled and so on), but there is 
no necessary affinity between the crime of aggression and natural law thought. Indeed, as 
Stephen Neff suggests in his book on law and war, Lorimer’s social Darwinism points in the 
                                                          
90
 R. v. Jones [2006] UKHL 16, at 44. 
91
 For a discussion, see Heller, ‘The Uncertain Legal Status of the Aggression Understandings’, 13(1) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2011) <first page?>. 
92
 Kampala Amendments, supra note 89. 
93
 Normand, supra note 17, at 61. 
94
 William Webb Archives, Australian War Memorial, File 3DRL/2481, Box 1, Wallet 8, 7–9, quoted in Boister and 
Cryer, supra note 63, at 282. 
other direction altogether. War could be a way of realizing a national destiny, liberty or progress 
that Lorimer values so highly.
95
  
I found the experience of rereading Lorimer melancholy, infuriating and sometimes even 
uncanny. Sometimes, the concerns are familiar, but the mood is unfamiliar; at other times, the 
opposite is the case. He comes across as astonishingly contemporary and yet also antique and 
distant – an embarrassing (great, great) uncle (and to return to the themes in the first part of this 
article, cold and disaffected, in comparison to the great figures of the Scottish Enlightenment). I 
will finish with a very emblematic Lorimer moment in which he is discussing the Iraq War (or 
perhaps the self-image of the discipline). International law, he complains, is neglected – until 
war arrives, at which point: ‘It is then we call in despair on the science which we despised.’96 
 
                                                          
95
 Neff, supra note 84, at 198, 218: ‘Such a way of thinking came dangerously close (to put it mildly) to an 
admission that outright aggression was perfectly legal.’  
96
 Normand, supra note 17, at 78.  
